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 Chapter 7 
 Restrictions on Access to Social Protection 
by New Southern European Migrants 
in Belgium 
 Jean-Michel  Lafl eur and  Mikolaj  Stanek 
7.1  Introduction 
 Since the post-war period, immigration into Belgium has passed through several 
stages: an infl ux of guest workers (predominately from Southern Europe), the clo-
sure of migrant recruitment programmes and subsequent intensifi cation of family 
reunifi cation, asylum seeking, and increased numbers of arrivals of EU migrants. 
Although recent fl ows have seen a predominance of Central and Eastern European 
migrants, Southern European migration to Belgium has also gradually increased. 
Forty years after the end of the guest worker programmes, old migration routes to 
Belgium thus seem to be reopening. 
 The context in which Southern European migration is occurring today is, how-
ever, signifi cantly different. Belgium is not the Member State that has received the 
largest numbers of EU migrants in recent years, and nor has it suffered the most 
from the economic crisis. Nevertheless, public support towards new EU migration 
has greatly decreased over the years (Freedman  2012 ). In particular, fears over the 
competition between native and foreign workers and concerns about the impact of 
the latter on the welfare system have become particularly salient. 
 Suspicion towards Southern European migration is a new phenomenon in 
Belgium. Indeed, following the guest worker era, the successful socio-economic 
and political integration of Southern European migrants had progressively turned 
them into the ideal-type of migrants in Belgian public debates. As we will show, this 
idealization process served mainly to delegitimize the presence of the third country 
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migrants who arrived after them. Newcomers from Southern Europe, however, no 
longer benefi t from the positive image associated with their predecessors. In policy 
terms, this change of attitude has materialized in new measures aiming at keeping 
undesirable EU migrants out. The most controversial of these measures consists of 
the removal of residence permits from unemployed EU citizens considered to rep-
resent an unreasonable burden on the Belgian public fi nances. Although migrants 
from Central and Eastern EU countries have been the most affected, a considerable 
number of nationals from North-Western and Southern EU countries have also been 
expelled. 
 The overall objective of this chapter is therefore to analyse how social policies 
have progressively become instruments of migration control in Belgium within the 
context of the economic crisis. First, we briefl y discuss the recent economic and 
social situation, and explore the impacts of the economic downturn on the Belgian 
welfare system. We then describe past and recent migration fl ows to the country and 
discuss the main socio-demographic features of foreign residents from Southern 
Europe and other EU regions. We also highlight the socio-economic situation of 
Southern European migrants in terms of activity and unemployment rates, and of 
access to selected welfare benefi ts. In the second part of the chapter, we demonstrate 
how the process of idealization of Southern European immigration has taken place 
in Belgium. This process has resulted in an implicit classifi cation between undesir-
able and desirable migrants. Accordingly, stricter immigration and integration poli-
cies are designed to keep the former out while still appearing attractive to the latter. 
We then focus on the specifi c policy of removing residence permits, targeting EU 
jobseekers during the economic crisis. We analyse the effects of this policy and, in 
the process, show that Belgium’s strict welfare provisions not only limit the free 
mobility of workers in times of crisis but also stigmatize new EU migrants as “wel-
fare shoppers”. On examining the mobilization of different organizations, we con-
clude by showing that—while they are numerically fewer—new Southern European 
immigrants are in a better position than other new immigrants to challenge policies 
that affect their freedom of circulation. 
7.2  European Migration to Belgium: Present Meets Past 
7.2.1  The Social and Economic Situation in Belgium 
in the Context of the Recent Global Crisis 
 Similarly to the vast majority of EU Member States, Belgium was hit by the eco-
nomic crisis in the late 2000s. In its initial phase (2008–2009), the turmoil mainly 
affected the fi nancial sector, as Belgian banks faced liquidity and solvency prob-
lems. However, the economic and social setback of the fi nancial system was further 
aggravated by a political crisis following the 2007 federal election, which left the 
country without a government for several months (Rihoux et al.  2011 ). Two 
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indicators illustrate Belgium’s diffi culties at the time. First, the general government 
defi cit rose from −1.3 % of GDP in 2008 to −6.0 % of GDP in 2009. Second, public 
debt increased from 89.6 % of GDP in 2008 to 96.2 % in 2009. In this period, 
Belgium was considered to be at high risk of falling into a long lasting and profound 
economic crisis along with other Member States such as Portugal, Spain, Ireland, 
Greece and Italy. 
 Even though in the years that followed, Belgium began to gradually recover from 
the initially dramatic turmoil, its economic performance remained fragile and 
mostly unstable (OECD  2015 ). As shown in Table  7.1 , the basic indicators of the 
Belgian economy have shown a fl uctuating pattern, with recovery in 2010 and 2011 
and, again, a slight decline in the following 2 years. Overall, Belgium seems to have 
performed just slightly better than the EU and the Eurozone average, as illustrated 
by the fact that the Purchasing Power Parity adjusted Gross Domestic Product per 
capita has remained 20 % above the average EU level throughout the economic 
crisis.
 The fi nancial turmoil in 2008 and 2009 has had negative consequences on the 
labour market in Belgium. Between 2008 and 2009, there was a net loss of 20,000 
jobs, or a net drop of 1.2 % (see Table  7.2 ). During the following 4 years (2010–
 Table 7.1  Evolution of GDP indicators in Belgium and the EU-27 
 GDP per inhabitant as a % of EU 
average: Belgium 
 GDP growth rate: 
EU-27 
 GDP growth rate: 
Belgium 
 2003  124 %  1.5  0.8 
 2004  121 %  2.5  3.6 
 2005  120 %  2.0  2.1 
 2006  118 %  3.4  2.5 
 2007  116 %  3.1  3.4 
 2008  116 %  0.5  0.7 
 2009  118 %  −4.4  −2.3 
 2010  120 %  2.1  2.7 
 2011  120 %  1.7  1.8 
 2012  120 %  −0.5  0.2 
 2013  119 %  0.2  0.0 
 2014  119 %  1.4  1.3 
 Sources: EU Labour Force Survey 2005–2013 
 Table 7.2  Evolution of unemployment rates in Belgium and the EU-27 2005–2013 
 Unemployment rate  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014 
 Belgium – total  8.3  7.5  7.0  7.9  8.3  7.2  7.6  8.4  8.5 
 Belgium – long term  4.2  3.8  3.3  3.5  4.1  3.5  3.4  3.9  4.3 
 Belgium – men  7.4  6.7  6.5  7.8  8.1  7.1.  7.7  8.7  9.0 
 Belgium – women  9.3  8.5  7.6  8.1  8.5  7.2  7.4  8.2  7.9 
 EU-27  8.2  7.2  7,0  8.9  9.6  9.6  10.4  10.8  10.2 
 Sources: Eurostat (EU Labour Force Survey), Algemene Directie Statistiek EAK 
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2014), variations in unemployment levels continued to refl ect the volatile socio- 
economic environment (De Mulder and Druant  2011 ). Yet, long-term unemployment 
remained relatively stable throughout this period, which confi rms the conjectural 
nature of these fl uctuations.
 Belgium’s approach to protecting employment during the crisis has consisted of 
keeping a fragile balance between activation policies undertaken on the federal and 
regional level, on the one hand, and austerity measures imposed by the European 
Commission on the other hand (Høj  2013 ). Activation measures have consisted 
mostly of implementing reduced working hours and temporary unemployment 
schemes to encourage employers not to terminate contracts (Hijzen and Venn  2011 ). 
Other measures have included the reduction of wage costs for certain categories of 
workers, full or partial exemption from social security contributions, and further 
training and job search assistance (Starke et al.  2011 ). 1 
 However, the economic slowdown and the instability of the labour market have 
resulted in the deterioration of living conditions and increasing inequalities in the 
country. This, in turn, has exerted a considerable stress on the non-contributory 
social assistance system. As shown in Fig.  7.1 , between 2008 and 2013, the number 
of benefi ciaries of the social integration income scheme ( Revenu d ’ Intégration 
Sociale , hereafter RIS 2 ) incremented by almost 14 % per year (from approximately 
1  In addition to active employment policies implemented before and during the crisis, other contex-
tual factors have mitigated the impact of the crisis. In this respect, we can mention the diversifi ed 
nature of the Belgian economy and the relatively high proportion of public jobs (especially in 
Wallonia). 
2  The social integration income scheme (RIS) provides a non-contributory minimum income for 
people with no suffi cient resources, who are unable to obtain them by their own efforts. Recipients 
are usually required to demonstrate the willingness to work, unless this is impossible for health or 
equity reasons. EU citizens who have a residence permit of more than 3 months in Belgium are 
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DAS
 Fig. 7.1  Evolution of absolute numbers within the social integration income (RIS) and right to 
social aid (DAS) schemes (Source: Intégration Sociale  2013 ) 
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141,000 to over 164,000). On the other hand, the number of individuals who 
 qualifi ed for the right to social aid sub-scheme ( Droit à l ’ Aide Sociale , hereafter 
DAS 3 ) incremented by almost 17 %, from approximately 63,000 in 2008 to 76,200 in 
2013 (Intégration Sociale  2013 ).
 The growing need for social assistance in times of crisis, however, has collided 
with the austerity measures imposed by both EU and Belgian federal policies. To meet 
the targets of the budget defi cit reduction plans, employment activation and welfare 
policy expenditure have been accompanied by tax increases and cuts in public spend-
ing in areas such as health care, education and pension schemes (Castanheira et al. 
 2014 ; Pignal  2012 ). In addition, more stringent controls and the supervision of benefi -
ciaries of social assistance have been introduced with the stated objective of reducing 
fraud and misuse of benefi ts (Nelson  2011 ). As we shall see in detail below, several of 
these restrictive measures have specifi cally targeted the immigrant population. 
7.2.2  Migration to Belgium: Historical Overview 
 Belgium’s migration history is profoundly shaped by its industrial history. During 
the nineteenth century and the progressive industrialization of the country, Belgium 
attracted a growing number of foreign workers, mostly from neighbouring coun-
tries. This phenomenon intensifi ed after World War I, which, in addition to migra-
tion from those countries, saw signifi cant numbers of migrants arriving from 
Southern Europe but also from Central and Eastern Europe, a situation that contin-
ued until the late 1930s (Stengers  1993 ). For instance, the number of Polish citizens 
recruited to work in Belgian coalmines grew from 198 in 1922 to almost 12,000 in 
1930 (Caestecker  1990 ). After World War II, the economic recovery fostered 
renewed immigration into Belgium through bilateral recruitment agreements with 
sending countries. The fi rst agreement was signed between Belgium and Italy in 
June 1946 and secured the recruitment of thousands of Italian workers for the coal 
and steel industries. As a consequence, Italians quickly became the largest foreign 
population in Belgium (see Table  7.3 ).
 The growing demand for labour and a dispute with the Italian government over 
the working conditions of Italian workers in the 1950s prompted the Belgian author-
ities to look elsewhere for labour. New agreements were thus signed with Spain, 
Greece, Turkey and Morocco during this period. As shown in census data, the num-
ber of immigrants residing in Belgium almost doubled between 1947 and 1970 and 
accounted for over 7 % of the total population in the eve of the Oil Crisis. Although 
Italians still constituted the largest foreign group (35 % of the total immigrant popu-
lation) in 1970, other Southern Europeans communities—such as Spaniard and 
Greeks—had grown signifi cantly. In the meantime, the Cold War reduced dramati-
3  The right to social aid scheme (DAS) is aimed at covering the basic needs of those sectors of the 
population that do not qualify for the right to social integration benefi ts (e.g. asylum seekers or 
foreigners who have the right to reside in Belgium but are not yet registered in the population 
registry). 
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cally Central and Eastern European migration to Belgium. One last noteworthy fea-
ture of Belgium’s post-war migration is that it explicitly allowed workers to come to 
the country with dependants in the hope that it would facilitate the workers’ adap-
tion to their new country while also addressing the country’s demographic defi cit 
(Bousetta et al.  2002 ). 
 This policy came to an end with the Oil Crisis and the government’s decision in 
1974 to cancel foreign worker recruitment programmes. However, this did not mean 
that migration stopped altogether. Indeed, the foreign resident population grew by 
almost 200,000 between 1970 and 1980 and their share of the total population 
reached 9 %. EU and third country migration to Belgium signifi cantly transformed 
between the Oil Crisis and 2000. First, European migration to Belgium continued to 
intensify with the European integration process. In spite of the slowing down of the 
migration of Italian nationals, who had historically represented the largest European 
population in Belgium, growing immigration from neighbouring countries and from 
Central and Eastern Europe largely compensated for this. The consolidation of the 
role of Brussels as the capital of the EU, together with the growing needs for labour 
force—in both high and low skilled occupations—continued to attract EU citizens 
to Belgium. Overall, the percentage of EU migrants from neighbouring countries as 
part of the total foreign population increased, while that of Southern European 
migrants decreased. Second, family reunifi cation schemes and relatively liberal asy-
lum policies also increased the share of third country nationals in the total immi-
grant population during the same period. 
7.2.3  New Migration of Southern Europeans to Belgium: 
Flows and Stocks 
 As discussed above, Belgium was not the EU Member State that was most affected 
by the fi nancial and economic crisis. For this reason, it has remained a relatively 
attractive destination country since 2008. As shown in Table  7.4 , the total yearly 
 Table 7.4  Migration fl ows in Belgium: infl ows, outfl ows and net migration 2000–2012 
 Infl ows  Outfl ows  Net migration 
 2005  97,888  44,298  53,590 
 2006  101,872  45,573  56,299 
 2007  109,926  45,437  64,489 
 2008  126,069  52,407  73,662 
 2009  126,877  57,873  69,004 
 2010  140,375  55,468  84,907 
 2011  138,071  58,000  80,071 
 2012  125,000  70,357  55,000 
 Source: RN-DGSIE 
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infl ow incremented from 93,345 to 138,071 between 2005 and 2011. Most of this 
increase was, however, due to recent EU enlargements to the East and the progres-
sive removal by the Belgian authorities of the transition periods limiting the free-
dom of movement of citizens proceeding from those Member States. For instance, 
the absolute number of Polish migrants arriving in Belgium each year increased by 
almost 50 % from 6694 to 9851 between 2005 and 2011. Romanian migration also 
increased in a more dramatic fashion after the 2007 enlargement (from 3059 arrivals 
in 2006 to 11,784 in 2011).
 Available data confi rms that the deterioration of the economic situation in 
Southern EU countries has been a driving factor for the reactivation, after almost 40 
years, of a new wave of migrants from this part of the continent. Although this fl ow 
is still comparatively less pronounced than migration from neighbouring countries 
and from Central and Eastern Europe, the number of new Southern Europeans arriv-
ing in Belgium is gradually increasing. As shown in Table  7.5 , among Southern 
European countries, Spain is currently the nationality with the highest volume of 
infl ow into Belgium. Arrivals of Spanish migrants nearly tripled from approxi-
mately 1900 in 2007 to over 5600 in 2011. In the case of Portuguese and Greeks 
migrants, the increase in arrivals has been signifi cantly less intense when compared 
with the Spaniards and the Italians and, obviously, with nationals from new acces-
sion countries. In 2011, however, arrivals from Southern EU countries represented 
only 11 % of the migration fl ows to Belgium.
 The composition of the immigrant population by nationality has undergone con-
siderable changes in recent years. Following the accession of Central and Eastern 
European countries, nationals from this area accounted for approximately 13 % of 
the total population in 2013 (see Table  7.6 ). The stock of nationals from neighbour-
ing countries, especially France and the Netherlands, has also increased steadily but 
its relative weight has remained unchanged (30 %). Similarly, despite the recent 
 Table 7.5  Immigration into Belgium by nationality 2005–2011 
 Nationality  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011 
 1  France  10,377  11,570  12,269  15,048  13,306  14,071  14,687 
 2  Romania  2322  3059  5491  4222  3592  8447  11,784 
 3  The 
Netherlands 
 10,109  11,488  11,370  12,321  9436  9654  10,198 
 4  Poland  4815  6694  9393  9183  10,345  9121  9851 
 5  Morocco  7106  7488  7831  8994  9957  10,360  9124 
 6  Spain  1827  1848  1902  3095  3861  4795  5603 
 7  Italy  2459  2613  2708  4499  4399  4747  5227 
 8  Bulgaria  853  797  2625  7257  6568  4553  4740 
 9  Portugal  1933  2030  2293  3541  3218  2910  3442 
 10  Turkey  3389  2999  3180  3965  3852  3914  3265 
 …17  Greece  716  558  495  855  830  829  1201 
 Others  31,481  32,289  33,788  53,089  57,513  66,974  58,949 
 Total  77,387  83,433  93,345  126,069  126,877  140,375  138,071 
 Source: RN-DGSIE 
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intensifi cation of arrivals, the overall stock of nationals from Southern EU countries 
has not shown any growth. In 2005, the total number of Southern Europeans resid-
ing in Belgium was 266,181, while in 2014 it was 266,157. However, given the 
larger infl ux of migrants from Central and Eastern EU countries, the share of 
Southern Europeans in the total population diminished from 30 % to 22 %. Italians 
and, to a much lesser extent, Greeks are two groups that decreased – respectively by 
22,000 and 1000 individuals. This decline is directly related to the ageing of 
migrants that arrived in Belgium during the 1950s and 1960s economic boom, and 
this decline has not been halted by the arrival of new cohorts of migrants from Italy 
and Greece. By contrast, in the period under consideration, the Spanish and 
Portuguese populations increased by over 10,000 each. In these two cases, a long- 
term decrease has been reversed by the intensifi cation of new arrivals since 2009.
7.2.4  Demographic and Socio-economic Characteristics 
of Southern European Migrants in Belgium 
 As has been already stated, the demographic structure of the Southern European 
migration into Belgium is strongly conditioned by the past immigration of guest 
workers. Figure  7.2a–c show the ageing demographic structure with a signifi cant 
predominance of people over 45 years old. This corresponds to the cohorts of post- 
war guest workers. On the other hand, it can be observed that the age structure has 
been changing in recent years. The share of the oldest and the youngest age catego-
ries of Southern Europeans is gradually increasing. In the latter case, this is a result 
of the increasing infl ow of new migrants after the outbreak of the crisis.
 This duality in the age structure of the Southern European population contrasts 
with that of other large populations in Belgium. Nationals from the new accession 
members are concentrated in the categories of young adults and adults (24–44 
years), which is consistent with the fact that this fl ow started relatively recently and 
is economically motivated. Migrants from neighbouring countries (France, 
Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) show a relatively balanced age struc-
ture. This is due partly to the diversity of reasons motivating those migrants to move 
to Belgium (work, retirement, family migration, study and a change of tax domicile) 
and partly to the fact that fl ows from these countries have been consistent over time. 
7.2.5  Labour Market Situation and Access to Non-contributory 
Social Benefi ts 
 The demographic structure of the Southern Europeans population is related to their 
socio-economic situation. According to Belgian Social Security statistics, in 2012, 
Southern Europeans had one of the lowest activity rates among all foreign-born 
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 Fig. 7.2  Evolution of age composition from 2008 to 2012: ( a ) Southern Europeans*, ( b ) EU-12, 
( c ) Neighbouring countries**. *Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, **Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
***France, Germany, Luxembourg, The Netherlands (Source: Banque Carrefour de la Sécurité 
Sociale 2008–2012) 
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residents. This can be explained in good part by the age structure of this population. 
Indeed, if we focus specifi cally on the most economically active age categories 
(between 25 and 64), immigrants born in Southern EU countries are, along with 
migrants from the new accession countries, the most economically active popula-
tion (see Table  7.7 ).
 Yet, compared to migrants from other EU countries, Southern Europeans are also 
at higher risk of being unemployed. This phenomenon can be explained, on the one 
hand, by the obstacles faced by newcomers in the initial process of adjusting their 
skills to Belgian labour market needs. On the other hand, it is also possible that the 
new wave of Southern European migrants lacks the support structures and social 
networks that helped the incorporation of their predecessors into the labour market 
because of the considerable time gap between the old and the new migration waves 
(see discussion on this below). 
 Interestingly, the obstacles in the process of the labour market integration of new 
Southern European migrants have had no signifi cant effect on their use of the 
Belgian non-contributory welfare system. As can be observed in Tables  7.8 and  7.9 , 
Southern Europeans rely only to a modest degree on benefi ts provided by the social 
integration income (RIS) scheme, which is the main form of non-contributory social 
assistance in Belgium (see footnote 2). After initial increases in 2008 and 2009, the 
 Table 7.7  Activity and unemployment rates of foreign born populations by origin 2012 
 Activity rate all 
populations 
 Activity rate age 
group 25–64 
 Unemployment rate age 
group 25–64 
 Southern EU  33.5 %  63.5 %  12.9 % 
 EU-12  50.0 %  64.7 %  5.9 % 
 EU neighbour  34.6 %  58.6 %  11.4 % 
 Other EU  32.2 %  48.7 %  6.8 % 
 Third country 
nationals 
 43.1 %  58.3 %  20.1 % 
 Belgium  43.7 %  87.7 %  7.6 % 
 Total  43.0 %  81.6 %  8.9 % 
 Source: Banque Carrefour de la Sécurité Sociale 
 Table 7.8  Proportion of benefi ciaries of the social integration income (RIS) scheme within each 
nationality 
 2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013 
 Southern EU  1.4 %  1.6 %  1.8 %  1.8 %  1.8 %  1.8 % 
 EU-12  3.1 %  3.9 %  4.6 %  4.2 %  3.5 %  3.0 % 
 EU neighbour  1.6 %  1.7 %  1.8 %  1.7 %  1.5 %  1.5 % 
 Other EU  0.6 %  0.7 %  0.8 %  0.7 %  0.6 %  0.6 % 
 Non-EU  8.9 %  8.7 %  8.4 %  7.5 %  8.4 %  7.1 % 
 Belgium  1.1 %  1.2 %  1.2 %  1.2 %  1.2 %  1.2 % 
 Total  1.4 %  1.4 %  1.5 %  1.4 %  1.5 %  1.5 % 
 Source: Intégration Sociale ( 2013 ) 
J.-M. Lafl eur and M. Stanek
111
share of benefi ciaries of this scheme among Southern EU migrants has been con-
stant and has not exceeded 2 % of this population. It is, however, higher than the 
share of Belgians and migrants proceeding from neighbouring countries. On the 
other hand, the share of Southern Europeans who take up social benefi ts from the 
RIS scheme within the total population of Belgium has remained stable, at approxi-
mately 3 %. It remains to be seen, however, whether the limited use of non- 
contributory benefi ts by Southern EU migrants is related to the restrictions and 
controls implemented by the Belgian authorities against EU citizens in recent years 
(Mussche et al.  2013 ).
7.3  Southern European Migrants in Belgium: 
From “Heroes” to “Welfare Shoppers” 
7.3.1  EU Migrants in Belgium: Evolution of a Concept 
 Large waves of immigration from Italy, and to a lesser extent from Spain, Portugal 
and Greece, durably marked Belgium’s immigration history during the twentieth 
century. They have left visible traces until today in many neighbourhoods and many 
of these immigrants and their descendants now occupy visible positions in politics, 
trade unions, civil society organizations and academia. The most noticeable symbol 
of this process of socio-economic integration is the former Prime Minister Elio Di 
Rupo, the son of Italian immigrants who came to work in the Walloon coalmines in 
the 1940s. The visibility process led many observers to conclude that twentieth 
century Southern European immigration into Belgium had been a “success”. In the 
past two decades, old Southern European migration fl ows to Belgium have thus 
been reinterpreted  ex post as a desirable form of immigration in migration debates 
in Belgium. But how has this changed with the infl ux of new Southern European 
immigrants following the 2008 crisis? 
 As the origins of immigration into Belgium from Southern and Central and 
Eastern Europe predate the process of European integration, contemporary distinc-
 Table 7.9  Distribution of benefi ciaries of the social integration income (RIS) scheme by 
nationality within the total population of Belgium 
 2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013 
 Southern EU  2.5 %  2.7 %  2.9 %  3.0 %  3.0 %  2.9 % 
 EU-12  1.4 %  2.0 %  2.8 %  3.1 %  3.0 %  2.9 % 
 EU neighbour  3.3 %  3.5 %  3.5 %  3.4 %  3.2 %  3.1 % 
 Other EU  0.2 %  0.2 %  0.2 %  0.2 %  0.2 %  0.1 % 
 Non-EU  19.4 %  17.9 %  17.7 %  17.6 %  17.6 %  17.0 % 
 Belgium  73.3 %  73.6 %  72.9 %  72.7 %  73.0 %  74.1 % 
 Total  100.0 %  100.0 %  100.0 %  100.0 %  100.0 %  100.0 % 
 Source: Intégration Sociale ( 2013 ) 
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tions made between EU migrants and third country nationals have not always guided 
the country’s immigration policies. As discussed in Part I, immigration into Belgium 
from border countries as well as from Italy and Poland fi nds its roots in the indus-
trial development of Wallonia in the nineteenth century and it underwent its fi rst 
acceleration after World War I. However, it was really after World War II that 
labour-intensive industries, such as coal and steel, stimulated demand for immigrant 
workers. The government thus developed a strategy of signing bilateral agreements 
fi rst with Southern European countries and later with Morocco (1964), Turkey 
(1964), Tunisia (1969), Algeria (1970), and Yugoslavia (1970). At the time of the 
fi rst bilateral agreement signed with Italy in 1946, the process of European integra-
tion had not yet started. The European Steel and Coal Community formed by 
Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Luxembourg was, in 
fact, only founded in 1951. Similarly, when Belgium signed bilateral agreements 
with Spain (1956) and Greece (1957) in order to recruit workers, neither of these 
two countries was yet a member of the European Community. This means that early 
Southern European immigrants did not come to Belgium under Community provi-
sions that would guarantee their freedom of circulation as workers. In other words, 
unlike today, the right of Southern European and North African immigrants to come 
to Belgium was guided by similar rules for most of the twentieth century. 
 This situation changed dramatically over time. The turning point came in 1968 
with the end of visa requirements for EC migrants and the implementation of the 
right to look for employment without a work permit (Martiniello and Rea  2003 ). 
These differences in status between immigrants proceeding from EC countries 
(only Italians at the time) and other immigrants were further reinforced with the 
recession that started in the late 1960s. By then, the government had strictly reduced 
the issuance of new work permits, and on August 1, 1974, it offi cially put an end to 
30 years of  laissez-faire immigration policy by restricting entry only to immigrants 
whose skills were needed. In spite of this measure, the foreign population in Belgium 
continued to increase in the decades that followed through the granting of visas to 
skilled workers, the immigration of students, family reunifi cation and the arrival of 
asylum seekers. 
 As the socio-economic conditions worsened in Belgium throughout the 1970s 
and 1980s, extreme-right parties began to build consistent electoral success on an 
anti-immigrant platform. By the early 1990s, the frontier between EC migrants and 
third country nationals was thus already very deep in Belgium. On the one hand, 
Italian and other Southern European migrants—as nationals of EC Member States—
enjoyed various employment, social and even political rights ensured by the trea-
ties. On the other hand, immigrants and their descendants proceeding from other 
parts of the world did not enjoy the same level of protection and were most affected 
by rising unemployment and xenophobia. 
 In this declining socio-economic environment, which affected most particularly 
the industrial region of Wallonia, the legal differences between EC and non-EC 
migrants established by the treaties became progressively associated with normative 
judgements regarding these populations. More precisely, as xenophobia towards 
non-EC immigrants has risen, a process of idealization of old EU immigrants (and 
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particularly of Italian immigrants) has taken place. In this sorting process between 
desirable and undesirable migrants, two dubious arguments are recurrently being 
used: the motivations behind migration and the “cultural distance” between migrants 
and natives. 
 Let us fi rst address the argument regarding motivations behind migration. Since 
the 1980s, anti-immigration parties have supported the idea that—unlike their pre-
decessors—new immigrants to Belgium do not come to work but to take advantage 
of the welfare system. One party in particular—the Flemish nationalist and xeno-
phobic party  Vlaams Blok ( later renamed Vlaams Belang )—has played a key role in 
the dissemination of this idea. Following on from its initial major success in the 
1987 legislative elections, running on an anti-immigration platform, the party for-
malized its stance through a 70-point programme in 1992. At the core of this pro-
gramme, many measures proposed differentiated access to social security and 
unemployment benefi ts, as well as a different taxation system for EU and for non-
 EU migrants (Erk  2005 ). Rhetorical arguments regarding the cost that third country 
migrants supposedly represent to the Welfare State is historically based on immigra-
tion statistics describing the types of visa granted to third country nationals in order 
to gain access to the national territory. Recent data confi rms that only a minority of 
third country nationals are granted residence permits for employment reasons (7.6 % 
in 2011), while family reasons (42.4 %), humanitarian reasons (10.3 %) and educa-
tion (6.7 %) represent the bulk of registrations (UCL & Centre pour l’égalité des 
chances  2013 ). This administrative data, however, exclusively refl ects the modali-
ties of access to the Belgian territory (e.g. family reunifi cation, study, etc.) and not 
necessarily the intentions of migrants once they get there. In other words, the inabil-
ity to obtain residence permits for employment reasons forces third country nation-
als to use other modalities to gain access to the employment market. 
 The second argument used to differentiate between new and old immigrants 
insists on the supposed inability of the new arrivals to integrate because their reli-
gious beliefs and cultural traits are too different from those of natives. Here too, the 
 Vlaams Belang has repeatedly used this argument to target third country immigrants 
and their descendants (especially those proceeding from Maghreb and Turkey) 
(Meuleman and Billiet  2005 ). Depicting old Southern European immigrants as cul-
turally closer to natives, however, contradicts historical accounts of the fi rst decades 
of Italian presence in Belgium. As shown by Martiniello ( 1992 ) and Morelli ( 1988 ), 
Italian immigrants faced high levels of discrimination in Belgium after World War 
II and were, in fact, frequently accused of being too culturally different and too 
religious to integrate into Belgian society. Moreover, these scholars also showed 
that the high level of socio-economic integration of Italian migrants and their 
descendants must be related to other factors. The more favourable economic 
 conditions in which these immigrants arrived and their ability to organize and 
occupy positions of power in trade unions and political parties are especially 
notable. 
 In spite of its lack of empirical foundations, this classifi cation of immigrants into 
the categories of desirable post-war EU migrants and undesirable third country 
migrants has a strong performative value in Belgian politics. Over the years, clas-
sifying immigrants has been key to justifying selective migration and integration 
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policies designed to continue to appeal to certain classes of foreigners. On the one 
hand, there are those that are considered to be both productive and able to integrate 
(e.g. highly-skilled workers, higher education students, wealthy EU citizens moving 
to Belgium for fi scal reasons, etc.), and public policies aim to attract these migrants 
into the country. On the other hand, there are the other groups that the policies aim 
to keep out (low-skilled immigrants, children and elderly citizens, asylum seekers, 
etc.). The reason for the spread of these ideas among Belgian policy-makers is to be 
found in the growing electoral success of the Vlaams Blok in Flanders. As shown 
by Koopmans et al. ( 2012 ), this party’s success turned migration and integration 
into central political issues, so that other parties also felt compelled to pick up on 
these themes during their electoral campaigns (see also Coffé  2005 ; Adam and 
Torrekens forthcoming). It is certainly the case that Vlaams Blok’s success never 
materialized in the form of government participation at the regional or federal level. 
Nevertheless, its ideas have been co-opted by other Flemish parties such as the 
right-wing nationalists of the New Flemish Alliance (N-VA) and the Liberal party 
(VLD), who have participated in several government coalitions since the late 1990s 
(Pauwels  2011 ). 
 With the accession of Central and Eastern European countries to the EU, the 
dichotomy between desirable and undesirable migrants has been applied for the fi rst 
time within the category of EU migrants. In both 2004 and 2007, Belgium—along 
other Northern European Member States—implemented transitional measures to 
delay by 7 years the date at which workers from new EU Member States could enter 
freely into the Belgian job market. As of 1 January 2014, all restrictions have been 
lifted in relation to the mobility of EU-8 and EU-2 workers. Belgian political elites, 
however, continue to question the legitimacy of the arrival of these workers in 
Belgium. First, Central and Eastern European workers continue to be accused by the 
authorities of competing unfairly against Belgian workers. Second, the increased 
visibility of Central and Eastern European migrants in Belgian cities has led to 
increasing accusations of welfare shopping among new immigrants in Belgium. 
This latter consideration, in particular, has led the Government to develop new poli-
cies to control access to welfare in Belgium. A central policy that deserves further 
analysis in this respect is the removal of residence permits from EU citizens claim-
ing benefi ts in Belgium. As we argue in the next section, this policy has led to 
increasing suspicion towards all EU migrants in Belgium and, in particular, towards 
new Southern European immigrants who left their country in the context of the 
economic crisis. 
7.3.2  Expelling EU citizens: The Limits of EU Citizenship 
in Belgium in Times of Crisis 
 The belief among political elites that foreigners could be attracted to Belgium 
because of its welfare system is not new, but it has not always been considered to be 
a policy issue in the country. In fact, Belgium even advertised the advantages of its 
social system in Mediterranean countries after World War II, in order to persuade 
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foreign workers to migrate to Belgium. It is thus only since the 1974 Oil Crisis and 
the subsequent decades of rising unemployment that foreigners have been increas-
ingly depicted as a strain on the country’s welfare system, in spite of a lack of evi-
dence on the matter. 
 Over the years, the belief that welfare benefi ts are drivers of migration has guided 
several policy reforms that have affected both EU and third country nationals. In 
other words, restricting foreigners’ access to social rights has progressively become 
a strategy to curb migration fl ows to Belgium. For instance, the idea that asylum 
seekers preferred Belgium over other destination countries because the benefi ts 
offered in Belgium were supposedly more generous than other countries led to the 
adoption of the 12 January 2007 Law on Asylum Seekers. This legislation strongly 
restricted the individual’s ability to receive any cash-benefi ts during the asylum 
process. 
 Attempting to limit the immigration of EU citizens into Belgium through welfare 
provisions is, however, a much more complex matter, as the right to the mobility of 
workers and citizens has been enshrined in treaties and EU legislation over time. 
Nonetheless, looking at the number of EU citizens who have lost their right to reside 
in Belgium after claiming benefi ts in the country (Table  7.10 ), it can be argued that 
control on welfare use has effectively been turned into an instrument by which the 
Belgian authorities intend to keep undesirable EU migrants out.
 As authorized by  Directive 2004 / 38 / EC on the right of citizens of the Union and 
their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member 
States , Belgium started in 2011 to remove residence permits from EU citizens on 
the basis that they represent an “unreasonable burden on the social system” of the 
host country. Citizens targeted by this measure are not employees and the self- 
employed but rather unemployed EU citizens. These EU citizens were originally 
granted residence permits in Belgium after they demonstrated that they possessed 
health coverage and suffi cient resources to live autonomously. Nevertheless, because 
 Table 7.10  Number of residence permits removed by nationality on the basis of Directive 
2004/38/EC 
 2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014 
 Spain  n/a  n/a  75  98  207  323  245 
 Italy  n/a  n/a  5  28  75  265  185 
 The Netherlands  n/a  n/a  60  102  161  305  209 
 France  n/a  n/a  21  32  109  176  n/a 
 Romania  n/a  n/a  43  96  402  816  634 
 Slovakia  n/a  n/a  91  108  73  60  n/a 
 Poland  n/a  n/a  11  n/a  70  66  n/a 
 Bulgaria  n/a  n/a  31  261  236  393  295 
 Other  n/a  n/a  6  817  585  308  474 
 Total  8  61  343  1542  1918  2712  2042 
 Change in %  –  662,50 %  462,30 %  349,60 %  24,40 %  41,40 %  -24,70 % 
 Sources: Offi ce des Etrangers ( 2008 ,  2009 ,  2010 ,  2011 ,  2012 ,  2013 ) 
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at some point after becoming offi cial residents in Belgium, these immigrants 
received some form of social welfare, they began to be expelled. It is striking to note 
that the number of EU citizens expelled on this basis has increased exponentially 
between 2010 and 2013. Indeed, in 2011, the Minister for Social Integration De 
Block issued an executive order allowing an automatic exchange of information 
between the Social Security Administration and the Belgian Immigration Offi ce. 
The consequence of this fl ow of information is visible in the sudden increase in the 
number of residence permits that were removed. 
 As documented in the press, many of these cases concerned citizens who applied 
for a living allowance or asked for social assistance because they faced a specifi c 
diffi culty (e.g. unexpected hospital or utility bills). In other words, it is the category 
of EU citizens considered to be a burden that is being specifi cally targeted by this 
policy. Yet, the defi nition used by the administration to defi ne social assistance is 
extremely lax. For instance, EU citizens hired under specifi c activation schemes 
fi nanced by the Social Security Administration to work in schools or hospitals have 
equally faced expulsion. The rationale was that such publicly-fi nanced jobs are not 
real jobs but rather a hidden form of assistance. The legality of such an interpreta-
tion has already been questioned in Belgium (Mormont and Neven  2014 ). Most 
importantly, however, the European Commission itself has expressed concerns over 
the sudden and dramatic increase in expulsions. It also reminded Belgium that it 
needed to pay more attention to the specifi c circumstances of each case, as expul-
sions should never be the automatic consequence of claiming benefi ts (European 
Commission  2014 ). 
 Looking at the nationality distribution of expelled EU citizens (Fig. 7.10), 
Romanians and Bulgarians have been the most affected by this policy. For these citi-
zens, Belgium’s policy to expel EU citizens who claim benefi ts is a continuation of 
previous policies that aimed to restrict their mobility into Belgium (e.g. through 
provisional measures that were only lifted on 1st January 2012). For this reason, the 
large-scale removal of residence permits among these nationals has failed to trigger 
a signifi cant reaction from either Belgian civil society or the governments of these 
two countries of origin. The reaction has been very different towards the expulsion 
of nationals from old Member States, whose mobility into Belgium had never been 
a contentious issue (Dutch and French citizens) or whose mobility into Belgium had 
been idealized over the years (Italian, Spanish and Portuguese citizens). 
 Southern European migrants in particular have been most adamant in denounc-
ing this new Belgian policy. During our fi eldwork in Brussels, conducted between 
April 2013 and November 2015, we came across three examples that demonstrated 
this. First, the Brussels’ chapter of the Spanish social movements  15  M and  Marea 
Granate (see Chap.  6 ) have organized numerous events in Brussels in order to shed 
light on the issue but also to raise awareness among new immigrants about the 
potential consequences of claiming social security benefi ts in Belgium. In November 
2015, these movements also jointly submitted a petition to the European Parliament 
Committee on Petitions, asking Parliament to remind Belgium that the automatic 
nature of its expulsion policy does not respect Directive 2004/38/EC (Cuartopoder 
10/11/15). Second, two other new associations created in Brussels by young Italian 
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newcomers—Giovani Italiani Europa and La Comune del Belgio—have also orga-
nized numerous events to raise awareness about the diffi culties of new Southern 
European immigrants. For instance,  Giovani Italiani Europa organized two major 
conferences inside the European Parliament calling on European authorities to 
facilitate the mobility of young Europeans but also calling on the Italian govern-
ment to adopt policies that will put an end to what they perceive as a new Italian 
brain drain.  La Comune del Belgio , by contrast, adopted a more pragmatic approach 
by setting up jointly with a Belgian non-profi t organization a free legal aid service. 
There, expelled EU citizens can receive advice on how to challenge the administra-
tive decision that forces them to leave the country. Third, together with a series of 
Belgian non-profi t organizations, the Italian Trade Union INCA–CGIL took the 
initiative to fi le a formal complaint to the European Commission regarding 
Belgium’s widespread expulsion of EU citizens. The letter explicitly asked the 
Commission to initiate an infringement procedure against Belgium. Their hope is 
that this will force the country to abandon or revise a policy that these organizations 
consider to be a breach of Belgium’s EU obligations (Osservatorio Inca  2014 ). The 
Commission responded favourably to this request and started to investigate the mat-
ter in June 2015. 
 Looking at these examples, it is striking to note that, despite being less affected 
numerically by the expulsions than other groups, Southern European immigrants 
have been the most vocal opponents of the policy. In fact, it is these immigrants who 
have managed to give the greatest visibility to the issue in the Belgian and European 
media and have managed to voice their concern in important forums such as the 
European Parliament. Similarly, Southern European migrants have set up the most 
elaborate legal responses to the policy using rights available at the Belgian and EU 
level. This situation can be explained by three factors. First, new Southern European 
immigration into the city of Brussels in particular consists partly of highly-educated 
migrants who come to Belgium in search of employment opportunities within the 
EU institutions and organizations that gravitate around them. It is thus not surpris-
ing that this particular kind of new migrant is more aware of his/her rights as a EU 
citizen but also more capable than others in catching the attention of the EU authori-
ties and the international media in Brussels. Second, even though the members of 
these new Southern European organizations tend to underline the diffi culty in con-
necting with co-nationals settled in Belgium for decades, new Italian immigrants—
in particular—are able to benefi t from an extensive network of Italian associations 
and institutions (trade unions, political parties, consulates, etc.), which have tradi-
tionally defended immigrant rights in Belgium. The support of the Brussels chapter 
of the Italian trade Union INCA-CGIL for the legal challenge against the Belgian 
government is very telling in this respect. Third, these new immigrant organizations 
are characterized by their strong transnational linkages with chapters of the same 
organizations in other destination countries or more simply with other immigrant 
organizations abroad. These linkages are an important resource when trying to chal-
lenge Belgium’s policy at the supranational level: it gives them visibility in foreign 
media and contributes to exposing Belgium at the international level in the hope that 
it will change its policy. 
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7.4  Conclusions: Welfare Policies as Tools for Migration 
Control 
 In this chapter, we have shown that Southern European Immigration into Belgium 
has increased since the beginning of the economic crisis. However, the arrival of 
these new immigrants failed to trigger perceptible fears among the population and 
policymakers. The perceived successful integration of previous immigration waves 
from Southern Europe has certainly facilitated the arrival of these new migrants in 
Belgium. At the same time, as a country characterized by a very open economy that 
also hosts several large international institutions, the number of high-skilled immi-
grants has also kept increasing at a steady rate over the last few years. 
 However, not all newcomers benefi t from an equally positive perception in 
Belgium. The increasing presence of asylum seekers and EU citizens proceeding 
from Central and Eastern Europe has, by contrast, been received from a negative 
perspective, and specifi c policies have been designed in recent years to discourage 
these forms of migration. In particular, access to welfare has been increasingly 
described as a “pull factor” that attracts potential immigrants more interested in 
receiving benefi ts than in working. In this regard, the rhetoric of the former Secretary 
of State for Migration and Social Integration De Block has been crucial in depicting 
Belgium’s social welfare as an overgenerous system that attracts undeserving immi-
grants. For this reason, she has made it a priority “to avoid immigrants coming here 
only to take advantage of the social system” (RTL info  2014 ). 
 However, this process of classifi cation of immigrants as either desirable or unde-
sirable largely precedes the crisis. Starting with the 1974 Oil Crisis and intensifying 
with the growing infl uence of the extreme-right party  Vlaams Belang on Belgian 
politics, Belgium has made gaining access to its territory increasingly diffi cult for 
third country nationals, whilst still adhering fully to the principles of the freedom of 
circulation of workers and citizens within the European Union. This has led to a 
strong differentiation in legal status (and perception regarding the legitimacy of 
their presence) between EU and third country migrants, who had long been treated 
on an equal footing in Belgium until the middle of the twentieth century. The pro-
cess of classifi cation within the category of EU citizens is, however, a more recent 
phenomenon, whose implementation is rendered very diffi cult by the protection 
offered to mobile EU citizens by treaties and directives. The fear of a possible mas-
sive arrival of immigrants after the accession of Central and Eastern European coun-
tries to the EU in 2004 and 2007 pushed Belgium—along with other North-Western 
EU Member States—to restrict temporarily the freedom of circulation of those citi-
zens described either as welfare shoppers or unfair competitors against Belgian 
workers. These restrictions have been progressively lifted, but the fear of invasion 
remains. Consequently, Belgium is now using other measures to keep undesirable 
EU citizens out, such as the intensifi cation of controls on worksites where posted 
workers are traditionally employed. 
 With the economic crisis and the increasing pressure on public fi nance, this pro-
cess of delegitimizing the presence of some EU citizens in Belgium has intensifi ed. 
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As Directive 2004/38/EC offers very little room for restricting the rights of mobile 
EU citizens, the control of EU citizens’ use of welfare rights is increasingly being 
used as a means to restrict access to the territory only to working EU citizens who 
are not considered to compete unfairly with Belgian workers. Whereas this policy 
targets primarily Romanian and Bulgarian citizens, the presence of Spanish, Dutch, 
Italian and French citizens in the list of nationalities most affected by the removal 
of residence permits has triggered strong debates in Belgium. The visibility given to 
this strict policy by the Secretary of State to Migration De Block has only contrib-
uted to reinforce the cliché according to which immigrants move to Belgium to take 
advantage of its welfare system. In addition, it has extended this cliché to EU citi-
zens whose presence in Belgium had never previously been questioned (the French 
and Dutch) or had even been considered as an example of successful integration 
within Belgium (Italians). 
 Previous occasions during which Roma migrants from Romania and Slovakia 
had been removed by the police from houses they illegally occupied had already 
confi rmed that citizens from those Member States were considered undesirable in 
Belgium. To see French and Southern European citizens expelled on similar grounds 
as Romanians and Bulgarians, however, marked a key moment in Belgium’s policy 
towards mobile EU citizens. By applying the strictest interpretation of Directive 
2004/38/EC when it comes to “welfare abuse” by mobile EU citizens, Belgium 
clearly intends to set strict limits on the concept of EU citizenship through its social 
policy. Unlike other groups of new immigrants, Southern European migrants have 
mobilized more visibly and more formally against Belgium’s policy. This greater 
ability to mobilize, we argue, is supported by the specifi c profi le of the new Southern 
European immigrants, their transnational connections and their ability to connect 
with home and host country institutions and organizations that have defended immi-
grant rights for decades. 
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